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Abstract In proof theory, a standard method for showing the correct-
ness of a program w.r.t. given pre- and postconditions is to construct
a weakest precondition and to show that the precondition implies the
weakest precondition. In this paper, graph programs in the sense of Ha-
bel and Plump 2001 are extended to programs over high-level rules with
application conditions, a formal definition of weakest preconditions for
high-level programs in the sense of Dijkstra 1975 is given, and a con-
struction of weakest preconditions is presented.
1 Introduction
Graphs and related structures are associated with an accessible graphical rep-
resentation. Transformation rules exploit this advantage, as they describe local
change by relating a left- and a right-hand side. Nondeterministic choice, se-
quential composition and iteration give rise to rule-based programs [21].
Formal methods like verification with respect to a formal specification are impor-
tant for the development of trustworthy systems. We use a graphical notion of
conditions to specify valid objects as well as morphisms, e.g. matches for trans-
formation rules. We distinguish the use of conditions by speaking of constraints
in the first case, and application conditions for rules in the latter. Conditions
seem to be adequate for describing requirements as well as for reasoning about
the behavior of a system.
A well-known method for showing the correctness of a program with respect to
a pre- and a postcondition (see e.g. [8,9]) is to construct a weakest precondition
of the program relative to the postcondition and to prove that the precondition
⋆⋆ This work is supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG), grants GRK
1076/1 (Graduate School on Trustworthy Software Systems) and HA 2936/2 (De-
velopment of Correct Graph Transformation Systems).
implies the weakest precondition.
program
postcondition
precondition
Wp
Decide
yes
no
weakest
precondition
In this paper, we use the framework of weak adhesive HLR categories to con-
struct weakest preconditions for high-level rules and programs, using two known
transformations from constraints to right application conditions, and from right
to left application conditions, and additionally, a new transformation from ap-
plication conditions to constraints.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, high-level conditions, rules and
programs are defined and an access control for computer systems is introduced as
a running example. In Section 3, two basic transformations of [18] are reviewed
and, additionally, an essential transformation from application conditions into
constraints is presented. In Section 4, weakest preconditions for high-level pro-
grams are formally defined and a transformation of programs and postconditions
into weakest preconditions is given. In Section 5, related concepts and results
are discussed. A conclusion including further work is given in Section 6. In Ap-
pendix A, the basic definitions of weak adhesive HLR categories together with
their basic properties are collected. A formal definition of partial derivations
within the execution of programs is given in Appenix B. Essential properties of
weakest preconditions and general facts on implication and equivalence of con-
ditions are given in Appendix C. Detailed proofs of some results are given in
Appendix D, while Appenix E completes an example how to construct weakest
preconditions. This report is a long version of [20].
2 Conditions and Programs
In this section, we review the definitions of conditions, rules, and programs for
high-level structures, e.g. graphs. We use the framework of weak adhesive HLR
categories introduced as combination of HLR systems and adhesive categories.
The basic definitions and properties of weak adhesive HLR categories are given
in Appendix A, whereas a detail introduction can be found in [15,17]. As a
running example, we consider a simple graph transformation system consisting
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of rules and programs. We demonstrate that programs are necessary extensions
of rules for certain tasks and conditions can be used to describe a wide range of
system properties, e.g. security properties.
Assumption. We assume that 〈C,M〉 is a weak adhesive HLR category with
a category C, a class M of monomorphisms, a M-initial object, i.e., for every
object G in C, there exists an object I in C with unique morphism I → G inM,
binary coproducts and epi-M-factorization, i.e. for every morphism there is an
epi-mono-factorization with monomorphism in M.
For illustration, we consider the category Graph of all directed, labeled graphs,
which together with the class M of all injective graph morphisms constitutes
a weak adhesive HLR category with binary coproducts and epi-M-factorization
and the empty graph ∅ as the M-initial object.
Example 1 (access control graphs). In the following, we introduce state graphs of
a simple access control for computer systems, which abstracts authentication and
models user and session management in a simple way. We use this example solely
for illustrative purposes. A more elaborated, role-based access control model is
considered in [24]. The basic items of our model are users , sessions , logs ,
computer systems , and directed edges between those items. An edge between
a user and a system represents that the user has the right to access the system,
i.e. establish a session with the system. Every user node is connected with one
log, while an edge from a log to the system represents a failed (logged) login
attempt. Every session is connected to a user and a system. The direction of the
latter edge differentiates between sessions that have been proposed (an outgoing
edge from a session node to a system) and sessions that have been established (an
incoming edge to a session node from a system). Self-loops may occur in graphs
during the execution of programs to select certain elements, but not beyond. An
example of an access control graph is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A state graph of the access control system
Conditions are nested constraints and application conditions in the sense of [18]
generalizing the corresponding notions in [14] along the lines of [33].
Definition 1 (conditions). A condition over an object P is of the form ∃a or
∃(a, c), where a:P → C is a morphism and c is a condition over C. Moreover,
Boolean formulas over conditions [over P ] are conditions [over P ]. Additionally,
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∀(a, c) abbreviates ¬∃(a,¬c). A morphism p:P → G satisfies a condition ∃a
[∃(a, c)] over P if there exists a morphism q:C → G in M with q ◦ a = p
[satisfying c]. An object G satisfies a condition ∃a [∃(a, c)] if all morphisms
p:P → G in M satisfy the condition. The satisfaction of conditions [over P ]
by objects [by morphisms with domain P ] is extended onto Boolean conditions
[over P ] in the usual way. We write p |= c [G |= c] to denote that morphism p
[object G] satisfies c. Two conditions c and c′ over P are equivalent on objects,
denoted by c ≡ c′, if, for all objects G, G |= c if and only if G |= c′.
We allow infinite conjunctions and disjunctions of conditions. In the context of
objects, conditions are also called constraints, in the context of rules, they are
called application conditions. As the required morphisms of the semantics are to
be in M, we sometimes speak of M-satisfiability as opposed to A-satisfiability,
where A is the class of all morphisms (see [19]).
In the following we introduce a short notation for conditions, which can be used
for application conditions over some rule-side L and for constraints over the
M-initial object I
Notation. For a morphism a:P → C in a condition, we just depict C, if P can
be unambiguously inferred, i.e. for conditions over some left- or right-hand side
and for constraints over the M-initial object I. Note, that for every constraint
over P , there is an equivalent constraint over I, i.e. d ≡ ∀(I → P, d), for d = ∃a
or ∃(a, c) .
Example 2 (short notation). The notation can be seen as a consequent gen-
eralization of the known shortcut ∃C. Consider the following graph constraints
“There is a system node” and “Every user is associated with a log node” together
with their short notations:
∃(∅ → )  ∃( )
∀(∅ → , ∃( → ))  ∀( , ∃( ))
Example 3 (access control conditions). Consider the access control graphs intro-
duced in Example 1. Conditions allow to formulate statements on the graphs of
the access control and can be combined to form more complex statements. The
following conditions are over the empty graph:
∃( ) A user is logged into a system.
∃( ) A user has an access right to a system.
∃( ) A user is connected with a log.
¬∃( ) There are not more than three failed, logged login
attempts for any system and any user.
¬∃( ) No two users are sharing a session.
∃( ) A session is proposed.
∃( ) A session is established.
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∃( ) ∨ ∃( ) A session is proposed or established.
∀( , ∃( ) ∨ ∃( )) Every session is either established or proposed.
∀( , ∃( )) Every user is connected with a log.
∀( , ∃( )) Every user that is logged into a system, has an
access right.
Figure 2. Conditions on access control graphs
We consider rules with application conditions [14,18]. Examples and pointers to
the literature can be found in [12,7].
Definition 2 (rules). A plain rule p = 〈L ← K → R〉 consists of two mor-
phisms in M with a common domain K. L is called the left-hand side, R the
right-hand side, and K the interface. An application condition ac = 〈acL, acR〉
for p consists of two application conditions over L and R, respectively. A rule
pˆ = 〈p, ac〉 consists of a plain rule p and an application condition ac for p.
L K R
G D H
m m∗(1) (2)
Given a plain rule p and a morphism K → D, a direct derivation consists of
two pushouts (1) and (2). We write G ⇒p,m,m∗ H , G ⇒p H , or short G ⇒ H
and say that m is the match and m∗ is the comatch of p in H . Given a rule
pˆ = 〈p, ac〉 and a morphism K → D, there is a direct derivation G ⇒pˆ,m,m∗ H if
G ⇒p,m,m∗ H , m |= acL, and m∗ |= acR. Let A be the class of all morphisms in
C. We distinguish between A-matching, i.e. the general case, and M-matching,
i.e. if the match and the comatch are required to be in M.
Notation. For the category Graph, we write 〈L ⇒ R〉 to abbreviate the rule
〈L ← K → R〉, where K consists of all nodes common to L and R.
Example 4 (access control rules). Consider the access control graphs introduced
in Example 1. The rules in Figure 3 are used to formalize the dynamic behavior
of the access control system, i.e. are the basis of the access control programs.
AddUser : 〈∅ ⇒ 〉
Grant : 〈〈 ⇒ 〉, 〈¬∃( ), true〉〉
Login : 〈 ⇒ 〉
Logout1 : 〈 ⇒ 〉
Logout2 : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
AccessS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
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ClearLogS : 〈ClearLog, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
ClearLog : 〈 ⇒ 〉
DeselectS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectUS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogoutUS1 : 〈Logout1, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
LogoutUS2 : 〈Logout2, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
RevokeUS : 〈Revoke, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
Revoke : 〈 ⇒ 〉
DeselectUS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectU : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogoutU1 : 〈Logout1, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
LogoutU2 : 〈Logout2, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
RevokeU 〈Revoke, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
ClearLogU : 〈ClearLog, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
DeleteU : 〈 ⇒ ∅〉
Figure 3. Rules of the access control system
Note, for every rule, every match is in M. AddUser is a plain rule to introduce
a user (and the associated log) to the system. Grant is a rule with application
conditions: It grants a user the right to access a system, unless the user already
has access. Login models a user proposing a session to a system, while Logout1
and Logout2 cancel an established or a proposed session, respectively. Rules with
suffix S, US and U concern selected sessions (S), user and systems (US) and user
(U) and are combined to programs in Figure 5. SelectS selects a session node by
adding a self-loop. AccessS switches the status of the connection from proposed
to established, if the user has an according access right. LogS will delete the
session, and log the attempt, if the user is not authorized to connect. ClearLogS
will remove one log entry of the session’s user’s log, if the connection is estab-
lished. DeselectS deselects a session node by removing a self-loop. SelectUS
selects a user and a system (with an access right). LogoutUS cancels a session
of that user to that system. RevokeUS will remove an access right of the user
to the system. DeselectUS deselects the user and the session. SelectU selects a
user to delete by adding a self-loop. LogoutU cancels a session of a selected user.
RevokeU removes an access right of a selected user. DeleteU deletes a selected
user together with his/her log node, if no edges are adjacent to the nodes.
We generalize the notions of programs on linear structures [8,9] and graph pro-
grams [21,30]) to high-level programs on rules.
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Definition 3 (programs). (High-level) Programs are inductively defined:
(1) Skip and every rule p are programs.
(2) Every finite set S of programs is a program.
(3) Given programs P and Q, then (P ;Q), P ∗ and P↓ are programs.
The semantics of a program P is a binary relation JP K ⊆ C×C on objects which
is inductively defined as follows:
(1) JSkipK = {〈G, G〉 | G ∈ C} and for every rule p, JpK = {〈G, H〉 | G ⇒p H}.
(2) For a finite set S of programs, JSK = ∪P∈SJP K.
(3) For programs P and Q, J(P ;Q)K = JQK ◦ JP K, JP ∗K = JP K∗ and
JP↓K = {〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ | ¬∃M. 〈H, M〉 ∈ JP K}.
Programs according to (1) are elementary; a program according (2) describes the
nondeterministic choice of a program; a program (P ;Q) is the sequential compo-
sition of P and Q, P ∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of P , and P↓ is the iter-
ation of P as long as possible. Programs of the form (P ; (Q;R)) and ((P ;Q);R)
are considered as equal; by convention, both can be written as P ;Q;R.
Example 5 (access control programs). Consider the access control graphs in Ex-
ample 1. The dynamic part of the control system Control∗ is the reflexive,
transitive closure of the programs Control = {AddUser, Grant, Login, Logout,
ProcessLogin, Revoke, DeleteUser}, depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respec-
tively. Logout cancels a session (established or proposed). ProcessLoginmodels
Logout = {Logout1, Logout2}
ProcessLogin = SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓; ClearLogS↓; DeselectS↓
Revoke = SelectUS; LogoutUS↓; RevokeUS; DeselectUS
LogoutUS = {LogoutUS1, LogoutUS2}
DeleteUser = SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓; ClearLogU↓; DeleteU
LogoutU = {LogoutU1, LogoutU2}
Figure 4. Programs of the access control system
the reaction of a system towards a session proposal, which, dependent on the
user’s right, leads to an established session and the clearing of the user’s log of
failed attempts, or the denial and removal of that session and the logging of the
failed attempt. Revoke removes a user’s right to access a system, but not be-
fore closing the user’s sessions to that system. Finally, DeleteUser is a program
to delete a user and his/her associated log by canceling the user’s sessions, by
removing the user’s access rights and by clearing the user’s log.
Note, that there is no way to model certain actions like DeleteUser by a single
rule, as a user, in principle, may have an arbitrary number of sessions or log
entries. However, user deletion should be a transaction always applicable for
every user.
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Remark 1. The definition of programs generalizes the one in [21]: We consider
a weak adhesive HLR category instead of the category of all directed, labeled
graphs. The programs are based on rules with application conditions instead of
plain rules. Moreover, we allow an explicit demonic nondeterministic choice of
programs. Every program in the sense of [21] is a program in our sense. By the
computational completeness result in [21], our language is expressively equivalent
to the one in [21] and closely related to programs on linear structures in the sense
of [8,9].
Definition 4 (termination). A program P applied to an input object G ter-
minates properly, if PDer(P, G) is finite, i.e. ∃k ∈ N. |PDer(P, G)| ≤ k, where
PDer(P, G) denotes the set of all partial derivations within the execution of a
program P , starting with G (see Definition of partial derivations, Appendix B).
Remark 2. Execution of high-level programs requires backtracking, therefore the
above definition of termination is more suitable than the classical one, i.e. the
nonexistence of infinite derivations. This may be seen as follows: An infinite
derivation implies infinitely many partial derivations. The other direction holds
only if the number of matches is finite. By the uniqueness of pushouts, PDer(p, G)
is finite and there cannot be infinitely many derivations of finite length for any
program P .
3 Basic Transformations of Conditions
In the following, we recall two known transformations from constraints to ap-
plication conditions and from right- to left application conditions [23,14,18] and
present a new transformation from application conditions to constraints. Com-
bining these basic transformations, we obtain a transformation from a postcon-
dition over the rule to a precondition. First, there is a transformation from con-
straints to application conditions such that a morphism satisfies the application
condition if and only if the codomain satisfies the constraint.
Theorem 1 (transformation of constraints into application conditions).
There is a transformation A such that, for every constraint c and every rule
p = 〈L ← K → R〉, and all morphisms m∗:R → H, m∗ |= A(p, c)⇔ H |= c.
Second, there is a transformation from right to left application conditions such
that a comatch satisfies an application condition if and only if the match satisfies
the transformed application condition.
Theorem 2 (transformation of application conditions). There is a trans-
formation L such that, for every rule p, every right application condition ac for
p, and all direct derivations G ⇒p,m,m∗ H, m |= L(p, ac)⇔ m∗ |= ac.
We consider a transformation of application conditions to constraints, which
correspond to the universal closure of application conditions. For A-matching
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however, the closure is over arbitrary morphisms and does not fit to the notion
of M-satisfiability. This is why a part of the application condition has to be
transformed accordingly.
Theorem 3 (transformation of application conditions into constraints).
For weak adhesive HLR categories with M-initial object, there is a transforma-
tion C such that, for every application condition ac over L and for all objects G,
G |= C(ac)⇔ ∀m:L → G. m |= ac
Construction. Define C(ac) =
∧
e∈E ∀(e◦i, Ce(ac)) where the junction ranges
over all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and i: I → L is the unique morphism from
the M-initial object to L. The transformation Ce is defined inductively on the
structure of the conditions: Ce(∃a) = ∃a′ and Ce(∃(a, c)) = ∃(a′, c) if a = a′ ◦ e
is some epi-M-factorization of a and Ce(∃a) = Ce(∃(a, c)) = false if there is
no epi-M-factorization of a with epimorphism e. For Boolean conditions, the
transformation Ce is extended in the usual way.
Example 6. The application condition ac = ¬∃( )∧¬∃( )∧¬∃( )
over expresses that there is no edge between two given session nodes.
C(ac) = ∀( , Cid(ac)) ∧ ∀( , Ce(ac))
= ∀( , ¬Cid(∃( )) ∧ ¬Cid(∃( )) ∧ ¬Cid(∃( )))
∧ ∀( , ¬Ce(∃( )) ∧ ¬Ce(∃( )) ∧ ¬Ce(∃( )))
= ∀( , ac) ∧ ∀( , ¬false ∧ ¬false ∧ ¬∃( ))
≡ ∀( , ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ true) ∧ ∀( , true ∧ ¬∃( ))
≡ ∀( , ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )) ∧ ∀( , ¬∃( ))
with id: → and e: → .
Proof. In [19] is shown: For all m′:L′ → G inM and all epimorphisms e:L → L′,
m′ |= Ce(ac
′) ⇔ m′ ◦ e |= ac′ (∗)
We show: ∀m:L → G, m |= ac if and only if G |= C(ac). “Only if”. Assume
∀m:L → G, m |= ac. For G |= C(ac) to hold, G has to satisfy Ce(ac) for all
epimorphisms e:L → L′, i.e. for all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and all morphisms
m′:L′ → G in M holds m′ |= Ce(ac). Given such morphisms e and m′, define
m = m′ ◦ e. By assumption, m |= ac, and by (∗) we have m′ |= Ce(ac), hence
G |= C(ac). “If”. Assume G |= C(ac), i.e. G satisfies Ce(ac) for all epimorphisms
e:L → L′, i.e. for all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and all morphisms m′:L′ → G in
M holds m′ |= Ce(ac). Given an arbitrary morphism m:L → G, consider the
epi-M-factorization m′ ◦ e. By assumption, m′ |= Ce(ac), and by (∗) we have
m |= ac.
Remark 3. The uniqueness of epi-M-factorizations (up to isomorphism) fol-
lows immediately from the uniqueness of epi-mono-factorizations, as every M-
morphism is a monomorphism.
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Remark 4. For weak adhesive HLR categories with M-initial object and M-
matching, there is a simplified transformation C such that, for every application
condition ac over L and for all objectsG, G |= C(ac)⇔ ∀m:L → G ∈M. m |= ac.
For an application condition ac over L and i: I → L, let C(ac) = ∀(i, ac). For
all M-morphisms m:L → G, m |= ac iff there exists an M-morphism p: I → G
such that for all M-morphisms m:L → G holds m |= ac iff there exists an M-
morphism p: I → G such that for all M-morphisms m:L → G with p = m ◦ i
holds m |= ac iff G |= ∀(i, ac) (Definition 1).
Finally, the applicability of a rule can be expressed by a left application condition
for the matching morphism.
Theorem 4 (applicability of a rule). There is a transformation Def from
rules into application conditions such that, for every rule p and every morphism
m:L → G,
m |= Def(p)⇔ ∃H.G ⇒p,m,m∗ H.
Construction. For a rule p = 〈q, ac〉, let Def(p) = Appl(q) ∧ acL ∧ L(p, acR),
where, for a rule q = 〈L ←l K →r R〉, Appl(q) = ∧a∈A¬∃a and the index set A
ranges over all morphisms a:L → L′ such that the pair 〈l, a〉 has no pushout
complement and there is no decomposition a = a′′◦a′ of a with proper morphism
a′′ in M (a′′ not an isomorphism) such that 〈l, a′〉 has no pushout complement.
Example 7. An example of Appl is given below for DeleteSys = 〈 ← ∅ → ∅〉.
Intuitively, the application of DeleteSys requires the absence of additional edges
adjacent to the system node. Therefore, DeleteSys may only be the last step in
program deleting a system node. Appl(DeleteSys) is a condition over .
Appl(DeleteSys) = ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )
∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )
∧ ¬∃( )
Proof. For plain rules, we show that, for every morphism m:L → G,
m |= Appl(q)⇔ ∃H.G ⇒q,m,m∗ H.
“Only if” Let m |= Appl(q). Assume there is no direct derivation G ⇒q,m,m∗ H .
Then the pair 〈l, m〉 has no pushout complement and there is a morphism a:L →
L′ such that 〈l, a〉 has no pushout complement and m |= ∃a. Then m 6|= Appl(q).
A contradiction. Consequently, there is a direct derivation G ⇒q,m,m∗ H .
“If” Let G ⇒q,m,m∗ H . Then, for every morphism a:L →
L′, m |= ∃a iff there is some m′:L′ → G in M such that
m′ ◦ a = m. By the pushout-pullback decomposition, the
pushout has a decomposition into two pushouts (1) and
(2) and, in particular, 〈l, a〉 has a pushout complement.
Consequently, for every morphism a ∈ A, m |= ¬∃a, i.e.
m |= Appl(q).
L K
L′ K ′
G D
l
m
(1)
(2)
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By the definition of Def and |=, Theorem 4, the statement above, and the def-
inition of ⇒, for every morphism m:L → G, m |= Def(p) iff m |= Appl(q) ∧
m |= acL ∧ m |= L(p, acR) iff ∃H.G ⇒q,m,m∗ H ∧ m |= acL ∧ m
∗ |= acR iff
∃H.G ⇒p,m,m∗ H . This completes the proof.
4 Weakest Preconditions
In the following, we define weakest preconditions for high-level programs sim-
ilar to the ones for Dijkstra’s guarded commands in [8,9], show how to con-
struct weakest preconditions for high-level programs and demonstrate the use
of weakest preconditions to reduce problems on programs, e.g. the invariance of
conditions, onto tautology problems of conditions.
Definition 5 (weakest preconditions). For a program P relative to a condi-
tion d we define: A condition c is a precondition, if for all objects G satisfying c,
(1) 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K implies H |= d for all H ,
(2) 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K for some H , and
(3) P terminates for G.
A condition c is a liberal precondition, if for all objects G |= c at least (1) is
satisfied, and a termination precondition, if for all objects G |= c at least (1) and
(3) is satisfied. A precondition c is a weakest precondition, denoted by wp(P, d), if
all other preconditions c′ of P relative to d imply c. Weakest liberal and weakest
termination preconditions, denoted by wlp(P, d) and wtp(P, d), respectively, are
defined analogously.
Example 8 (weakest precondition). Consider the access control rules in Exam-
ple 4. A weakest precondition for the rule SelectU: 〈 ⇒ 〉 and the post-
condition ¬∃( ) is ¬∃( ).
The following fact points out a simple proof scheme for weakest preconditions.
Fact 1 (weakest preconditions). A condition c is a weakest precondition if,
for all objects G, G |= c if and only if properties (1)-(3) are satisfied.
Proof. By definition, c is a precondition. For any other precondition c′, for every
object G, G |= c′ implies properties (1)-(3) are satisfied (c′ is a precondition),
which implies G |= c, hence c′ implies c.
For the construction of weakest preconditions, we make use of the fact that
wp(P, d) is a conjunction of three properties and treat properties (1) and (3),
and property (2) separately.We observe property (2) is equivalent to the negation
of property (1) for d = ¬true, hence we state:
Fact 2 (existence of results). G |= ¬wlp(P, false)⇔ property (2) is satisfied.
11
Proof. There is an object H such that 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K, if and only if there is an
object H such that 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K and H |= true, if and only if not for all objects
H holds not (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K and H |= true), if and only if not for all objects H
holds not 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K or H 6|= true, if and only if not for all objects H holds
〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K implies H |= false.
Theorem 5 (weakest liberal preconditions). There is a transformation
Wlp, such that for every program P and every condition d,Wlp(P, d) is a weakest
liberal precondition of P relative to d.
Construction. The transformation is defined inductively over the structure of
programs. For any rule p, any set S of programs and programs P, Q,
Wlp(p, d) = C(Def(p)⇒ L(p,A(p, d)))
Wlp(Skip, d) = d
Wlp(S, d) =
∧
P∈S Wlp(P, d)
Wlp((P ;Q), d) = Wlp(P,Wlp(Q, d))
Wlp(P ∗, d) =
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d)
Wlp(P↓, d) = Wlp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false)⇒ d)
where for i ≥ 0, P i is inductively defined by Skip for i = 0 and by P i+1 = (P i;P ).
Proof. We show Wlp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) by induction over the structure of pro-
grams. For elementary programs consisting of a single rule p, we have: For all
objects G,
G |= Wlp(p, d)
⇔ G |= C(Def(p)⇒ L(p,A(p, d))) (Def. Wlp)
⇔ ∀L
m
→G. m |= (Def(p)⇒ L(p,A(p, d))) (Thm. 3)
⇔ ∀L
m
→G. m |= Def(p)⇒ m |= L(p,A(p, d)) (Def. |=)
⇔ ∀L
m
→G, R
m∗
→H. m |= Def(p)⇒ m∗ |= A(p, d) (Thm. 2)
⇔ ∀L
m
→G, R
m∗
→H. (G ⇒p,m,m∗ H)⇒ H |= d (Thms. 4 & 1)
⇔ ∀H. 〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d (Def. JpK)
⇔ G |= wlp(p, d) (Def. wlp)
Thus, Wlp(p, d) is a weakest liberal precondition of p relative to d. For composed
programs, the statement follows by structural induction (see Appendix D).
Assumption. We assume that 〈C,M〉 is a weak adhesive HLR category with
finite number of matches, i.e. for every morphism l:K → L in M and every
object G, there exist only a finite number of morphisms m:L → G s.t. 〈l, m〉 has
a pushout complement.
Theorem 6 (weakest preconditions). For weak adhesive HLR categories
with finite number of matches, there are transformations Wtp and Wp such that
for every program P and every condition d, Wtp(P, d) is a weakest termination
precondition and Wp(P, d) is a weakest precondition of P relative to d.
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Construction. For any program P , Wp(P, d) = Wtp(P, d) ∧ ¬Wlp(P, false),
where Wtp is inductively defined for any rule p, any set S of programs and
programs P, Q as follows:
Wtp(p, d) = Wlp(p, d)
Wtp(Skip, d) = d
Wtp(S, d) =
∧
P∈S Wtp(P, d)
Wtp((P ;Q), d) = Wtp(P,Wtp(Q, d))
Wtp(P ∗, d) =
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d ∧Wtp(P, true)) ∧
∨∞
k=0 Wlp(P
k+1, false)
Wtp(P↓, d) = Wtp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false)⇒ d)
where for i ≥ 0, P i is inductively defined by Skip for i = 0 and by P i+1 = (P i;P ).
Proof. We showWtp(P, d) ≡ wtp(P, d), andWp(P, d) ≡ wp(P, d). The first proof
is done by induction over the structure of programs. For elementary programs
consisting of a single rule p, we have: For every object G, G |= Wtp(p, d) if and
only if G |= Wlp(p, d), as every rule application terminates by the finiteness
assumption and wtp reduces to wlp for single rules p. For composed programs,
the statement follows by structural induction (see Appendix D).
For Wp, we now show for every program P , Wp(P, d) ≡ wp(P, d): Wp(P, d)
is defined as ¬Wlp(P, false) ∧Wtp(P, d), which is, by the first two equations,
equivalent to ¬wlp(P, false) ∧ wtp(P, d), which is equivalent to wp(P, d) (see
Fact 4.(4), Appendix D).
Example 9 (access control system). Consider the access control for computer
systems, presented in Examples 1-5. For the system, one might want to ensure
the validity of certain properties, e.g.:
(1) Always, every user logged into a system has an access right to the system:
secure implies wlp(Control, secure), where
secure = ∀( , ∃( )).
(2) Every user can always be deleted: ∃( ) implies wp(DeleteUser, true)
(3) Every user can always have his access right to a system revoked:
∃( ) implies wp(Revoke, true)
By calculating weakest [liberal] preconditions, the problem to decide these prop-
erties can be reduced onto the tautology problem for conditions. For a program
P , the meaning of secure implies wlp(P, secure) can be seen as follows: The con-
straint secure is invariant for P , i.e., given an input state satisfying secure, any
result of P will satisfy secure. According to the definition of Wlp, we would have
to show secure implies Wlp(P, secure) for every program P ∈ Control.
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For the program AddUser, we prove secure implies Wlp(AddUser, secure):
A(AddUser, secure) = ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
L(AddUser,A(AddUser, secure)) = ∀( , ∃( )) = secure
Wlp(AddUser, secure) = C(Def(AddUser)⇒ L(AddUser,A(AddUser, secure)))
= C((Appl(AddUser) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ secure)
≡ C(true⇒ secure) ≡ C(secure)
= ∀(∅, secure)
≡ secure
where we use Fact 5.(2) for the second last step. The validity of the state-
ment is no surprise as we could have argued that a newly added user cannot
have an established session with a system, hence every application of AddUser
preserves the satisfaction of secure. For the program Grant, secure implies
Wlp(Grant, secure), even without the additional application condition.
L(Grant,A(Grant, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ) ∨ ∃( ))
Wlp(Grant, secure)
= C(Def(Grant)⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
= C((Appl(Grant) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ true)⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
≡ C(¬∃( )⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
if C(L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
if ∀( , L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
if ∀( , ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ true
if ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last three steps respectively (see
Appendix C). The validity of the statement can be seen as follows: For a user
and a system, Grant adds the corresponding access right. Apart from the left
application condition, if there was already an established session from that user
to that system, the precondition secure would have ensured the presence of a
corresponding access right. The same holds for every other user and/or system.
This example is continued in Appendix E.
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5 Related concepts
In this section we briefly review other work on using graph transformation for
verification. Before we do so, however, we wish to point out one important global
difference between this related work and the approach of this paper.
– The approach of this paper is based on the principle of assertional reasoning,
and inherits both the advantage and the disadvantage of that principle. The
advantage is that the approach is general where it can be made to apply,
meaning that it provides a method to verify finite-state and infinite-state
systems alike. The disadvantage is that finding invariants is hard and cannot
be automated in general.
– Existing approaches are typically based on the principle of model check-
ing, which essentially involves exhaustive exploration, either of the concrete
states (which are often too numerous to cover completely) or on some level of
abstraction (in which case the results become either unsound or incomplete).
On the positive side, model checking is a push-button approach, meaning
that it requires no human intervention.
In other words, there is a dividing line between the work in this paper and the
related work reported below, which is parallel to the division between theorem
proving and model checking in “mainstream” verification (see [22] for an early
discussion). Since current wisdom holds that these approaches can actually be
combined to join strengths (e.g., [6,28]), we expect that the same will turn out
to hold in the context of graph transformation.
The first paper in which it was put forward that graph transformation sys-
tems can serve as a suitable specification formalism on the basis of which model
checking can be performed was Varro´ [35]; this was followed up by [36] which
describes a tool chain by which graph transformation systems are translated
to Promela, and then model checked by SPIN. We pursued a similar approach
independently in [31,32], though relying on dedicated (graph transformation-
based) state space generation rather than an existing tool. The two strands were
compared in [34]. Again independently, Dotti et al. [11,10] also describe a trans-
lation from a graph transformation-based specification formalism (which they
call object-based graph grammars) to Promela.
Another model checking-related approach, based on the idea of McMillan unfold-
ings for Petri Nets (see [27]), has been pursued by Baldan, Ko¨nig et al. in, e.g.,
[3,2], and in combination with abstraction in [4,25]. The latter avoids the gener-
ation of complete (concrete) state spaces, at the price of being approximative, in
other words, admitting either false positives (unsoundness) or false negatives (in-
completeness) in the analysis. The (pure) model checking and abstraction-based
techniques were briefly compared in [5].
Termination. In addition to the general verification methods discussed above, a
lot of research has been carried out on more specific properties of graph gram-
mars. Especially relevant in our context is the work on termination of graph
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grammars. This is known to be undecidable in general (see [29]), but under spe-
cial circumstances may be shown to hold; for instance, Ehrig et al. discuss such
a special case for model transformation in [13].
6 Conclusion
This paper extends graph programs to programs over high-level rules with ap-
plication conditions, and defines weakest preconditions over high-level programs
similar to the ones for Dijkstra’s guarded commands in [8,9]. It presents trans-
formations from application conditions to constraints, which, combined with two
known transformations over constraints and application conditions, can be used
to construct weakest preconditions for high-level rules as well as programs.
A known proof technique for showing the correctness of a program with respect
to a pre- and a postcondition is to construct a weakest precondition and to
show that the precondition implies the weakest precondition. We demonstrate
the applicability of this method on our access control for computer systems.
Further topics could be the followings.
(1) Consideration of strongest postconditions.
(2) Comparison of notions: A comparison of conditions – as considered in this
paper – and first-order formulas on graphs and high-level structures.
(3) Generalization of notions: The generalization of conditions to capture monadic
second order properties.
(4) An investigation of the tautology problem for conditions with the aim to
find a suitable class of conditions, for which the problem is decidable.
(5) Implementation: A system for computing/approximating weakest precon-
ditions and for deciding/semideciding correctness of program specifications
[1].
References
1. K. Azab, A. Habel, K.-H. Pennemann, and C. Zuckschwerdt. ENFORCe: A system
for ensuring formal correctness of high-level programs. In Preliminary Proc. 3rd
International Workshop on Graph Based Tools (GraBaTs’06), 2006. To appear.
2. P. Baldan, A. Corradini, and B. Ko¨nig. Verifying finite-state graph grammars. In
Concurrency Theory, volume 3170 of LNCS, pages 83–98. Springer, 2004.
3. P. Baldan and B. Ko¨nig. Approximating the behaviour of graph transformation
systems. In Graph Transformations (ICGT’02), volume 2505 of LNCS, pages 14–
29. Springer, 2002.
4. P. Baldan, B. Ko¨nig, and B. Ko¨nig. A logic for analyzing abstractions of graph
transformation systems. In Static Analysis Symposium (SAS), volume 2694 of
LNCS, pages 255–272. Springer, 2003.
5. P. Baldan, B. Ko¨nig, and A. Rensink. Graph grammar verification through abstrac-
tion. In B. Ko¨nig, U. Montanari, and P. Gardner, editors, Graph Transformations
and Process Algebras for Modeling Distributed and Mobile Systems, number 04241
in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, 2005.
16
6. E. M. Clarke, A. Biere, R. Raimi, and Y. Zhu. Bounded model checking using
satisfiability solving. Formal Methods in System Design, 19(1):7–34, 2001.
7. A. Corradini, U. Montanari, F. Rossi, H. Ehrig, R. Heckel, and M. Lo¨we. Alge-
braic approaches to graph transformation. In Handbook of Graph Grammars and
Computing by Graph Trans., volume 1, pages 163–245. World Scientific, 1997.
8. E. W. Dijkstra. A Discipline of Programming. Prentice-Hall, 1976.
9. E. W. Dijkstra and C. S. Scholten. Predicate Calculus and Program Semantics.
Springer, 1989.
10. O. M. dos Santos, F. L. Dotti, and L. Ribeiro. Verifying object-based graph gram-
mars. ENTCS, 109:125–136, 2004.
11. F. L. Dotti, L. Foss, L. Ribeiro, and O. M. dos Santos. Verification of distributed
object-based systems. In Formal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Sys-
tems (FMOODS), volume 2884 of LNCS, pages 261–275. Springer, 2003.
12. H. Ehrig. Introduction to the algebraic theory of graph grammars. In Graph-
Grammars and Their Application to Computer Science and Biology, volume 73 of
LNCS, pages 1–69. Springer, 1979.
13. H. Ehrig, K. Ehrig, J. De Lara, G. Taentzer, D. Varro´, and S. Varro´-Gyapay.
Termination criteria for model transformation. In Proc. Fundamental Approaches
to Software Engineering, volume 2984 of LNCS, pages 214–228. Springer, 2005.
14. H. Ehrig, K. Ehrig, A. Habel, and K.-H. Pennemann. Theory of constraints and
application conditions: From graphs to high-level structures. Fundamenta Infor-
maticae, 2006. To appear.
15. H. Ehrig, K. Ehrig, U. Prange, and G. Taentzer. Fundamentals of Algebraic Graph
Transformation. EATCS Monographs of Theoretical Computer Science. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 2006.
16. H. Ehrig, A. Habel, H.-J. Kreowski, and F. Parisi-Presicce. Parallelism and con-
currency in high level replacement systems. MSCS, 1:361–404, 1991.
17. H. Ehrig, A. Habel, J. Padberg, and U. Prange. Adhesive high-level replacement
systems: A new categorical framework for graph transformation. Fundamenta In-
formaticae, 2006. To appear.
18. A. Habel and K.-H. Pennemann. Nested constraints and application conditions
for high-level structures. In Formal Methods in Software and System Modeling,
volume 3393 of LNCS, pages 293–308. Springer, 2005.
19. A. Habel and K.-H. Pennemann. Satisfiability of high-level conditions. In Graph
Transformations (ICGT’06), volume 4178 of LNCS, pages 430–444. Springer, 2006.
20. A. Habel, K.-H. Pennemann, and A. Rensink. Weakest preconditions for high-
level programs. In Graph Transformations (ICGT’06), volume 4178 of LNCS,
pages 445–460. Springer, 2006.
21. A. Habel and D. Plump. Computational completeness of programming languages
based on graph transformation. In Proc. Foundations of Software Science and
Computation Structures, volume 2030 of LNCS, pages 230–245. Springer, 2001.
22. J. Y. Halpern and M. Y. Vardi. Model checking vs. theorem proving: A manifesto.
In J. Allen, R. Fikes, and E. Sandewall, editors, Proc. International Conference on
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 325–334. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers, 1991.
23. R. Heckel and A. Wagner. Ensuring consistency of conditional graph grammars.
In SEGRAGRA’95, volume 2 of ENTCS, pages 95–104, 1995.
24. M. Koch, L. V. Mancini, and F. Parisi-Presicce. Graph-based specification of access
control policies. Journal of Computer and System Sciences (JCSS), 71:1–33, 2005.
17
25. B. Ko¨nig and V. Kozioura. Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement for
the analysis of graph transformation systems. In Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), volume 3920 of LNCS, pages
197–211. Springer, 2006.
26. S. Lack and P. Sobocinski. Adhesive categories. In Foundations of Software Science
and Computation Structures (FOSSACS’04), volume 2987 of LNCS, pages 273–288.
Springer, 2004.
27. K. L. McMillan. Using unfoldings to avoid the state explosion problem in the
verification of asynchronous circuits. In Fourth Workshop on Computer-Aided
Verification (CAV), volume 663 of LNCS, pages 164–174. Springer, 1992.
28. S. Owre, J. M. Rushby, and N. Shankar. PVS: A prototype verification system.
In 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE), volume 607
of LNCS, pages 748–752. Springer, 1992.
29. D. Plump. Termination of graph rewriting is undecidable. Fundamenta Informat-
icae, 33(2):201–209, 1998.
30. D. Plump and S. Steinert. Towards graph programs for graph algorithms. In Graph
Transformations (ICGT’04), volume 3256 of LNCS, pages 128–143. Springer, 2004.
31. A. Rensink. Towards model checking graph grammars. In M. Leuschel, S. Gruner,
and S. L. Presti, editors, Workshop on Automated Verification of Critical Sys-
tems (AVoCS), Technical Report DSSE-TR-2003-2, pages 150–160. University of
Southhampton, 2003.
32. A. Rensink. The GROOVE simulator: A tool for state space generation. In Ap-
plications of Graph Transformations with Industrial Relevance (AGTIVE), volume
3062 of LNCS, page 485. Springer, 2004.
33. A. Rensink. Representing first-order logic by graphs. In Graph Transformations
(ICGT’04), volume 3256 of LNCS, pages 319–335. Springer, 2004.
34. A. Rensink, A´. Schmidt, and D. Varro´. Model checking graph transformations:
A comparison of two approaches. In Graph Transformations (ICGT’04), volume
3256 of LNCS, pages 226–241. Springer, 2004.
35. D. Varro´. Towards symbolic analysis of visual modeling languages. ENTCS, 72(3),
2003.
36. D. Varro´. Automated formal verification of visual modeling languages by model
checking. Journal of Software and Systems Modelling, 3(2):85–113, 2004.
A Weak Adhesive HLR Categories
We recall the notions of weak adhesive high-level replacement (HLR) categories.
Adhesive HLR-sytstems, a combination of HLR-systems and adhesive categories,
are systematically studied in [17,15].
Definition 6 (weak adhesive HLR category). A category C with a morphism
class M is called weak adhesive HLR category, if the following properties hold.
(1) M is a class of monomorphisms closed under compositions and decomposi-
tions, i.e. f ∈ M, g ∈ M implies g ◦ f ∈ M and g ◦ f ∈ M, g ∈ M implies
f ∈M.
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(2) C has pushouts and pullbacks along M-morphisms, i.e. pushouts and pull-
backs, where at least one of the given morphisms is inM, andM-morphisms
are closed under pushouts and pullbacks, i.e. given a pushout (1), m ∈ M
implies n ∈M and, given a pullback (1), n ∈M implies m ∈ M.
A C
B D
m n(1)
(3) Pushouts in C along M-morphisms are weak VK-squares, i.e. for any com-
mutative cube in C where we have the pushout with m ∈ M and (f ∈ M
or b, c, d ∈M) in the bottom and the back faces are pullbacks, it holds: the
top is pushout iff the front faces are pullbacks.
A
B
C
D
A′
B′
C′
D′
m
f
b
c
d
Example 10. Examples of weak adhesive categories are the category 〈Graph,M〉
of graphs with class M of all injective graph morphisms and the category
〈Spec,M〉 of algebraic specifications with class M of all strict injective specifi-
cation morphisms.
Weak adhesive HLR-categories have a number of nice properties, called HLR
properties [16].
Fact 3 (HLR properties of adhesive HLR categories). Given a weak
adhesive HLR-category 〈C,M〉, the following HLR conditions are satisfied.
(1) Pushouts along M-morphisms are pullbacks.
(2) Pushout-pullback decomposition. If the diagram (1)+(2) is a pushout, (2) a
pullback, w ∈M and (l ∈M or c ∈ M), then (1) and (2) are pushouts and
also pullbacks.
A C
B D
E
F
(1) (2)
c
l s
u
r
w
v
(3) Uniqueness of pushout complements for M-morphisms. Given morphisms
c:A → C in M and s:C → D, then there is up to isomorphism at most one
B with l:A → B and u:B → D such that diagram (1) is a pushout.
Proof. See [26,17,15].
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B Partial Derivations
In this section, we define the set of all partial derivations within the execution
of a program P .
The semantic of programs does not suffice to give a formal notion of program
termination. Therefore, we define the set of all partial derivations of a program
starting form an object G. Beforehand, let D, D′ be sets of derivations and define
D ·D′ = {d ⇒0 d′ | d ∈ D, d′ ∈ D′ and In(d′) ∼= Res(d)}, where In(G⇒∗ H) = G
and Res(G⇒∗ H) = H for every derivation sequence G⇒∗ H .
Definition 7 (partial derivations). Let Der(P ) be the set of all derivations
of a given program P , i.e. G ⇒∗ H ∈ Der(P ) if and only if 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K. The
set of all partial derivations PDer(P ) within the execution of a program P is
defined inductively. For a rule p, for a finite set S of programs and programs
P, Q, let
PDer(Skip) = Der(Skip)
PDer(p) = PDer(Skip) ∪Der(p)
PDer(S) =
⋃
P∈S PDer(P )
PDer((P ;Q)) = PDer(P ) ∪Der(P ) · PDer(Q)
PDer(P ∗) = Der(P ∗) · PDer(P )
PDer(P↓) = PDer(P ∗)
Consider Der(P, G), PDer(P, G) to be restrictions of Der(P ) and PDer(P ) to
derivations with input G.
Remark 5. PDer may consist of derivations which are not a part of any derivation
in Der.
Example 11. Assume, G⇒H in Der(P ) and ∄M ∈ C. H ⇒M ∈ Der(Q). Then
the dead end G⇒H is in PDer(P ;Q), while it is not a part of any deriation in
Der(P ;Q).
The following lemma over sets of derivations is used in the proof of Wtp(P, true) ≡
wtp(P, true) in Appendix D.
Lemma 1 (set of derivations). Let Di be a set of derivations for every i ∈ N.
If Di = ∅ implies Di+1 = ∅ and if Di+1 6⊆
⋃i
j=0 Dj for every i ∈ N, we have:⋃∞
i=0 Di is finite implies there is a natural number k ∈ N such that
⋃∞
i=0 Di =⋃k
i=0 Di and Dk+1 = ∅.
Proof. For every set of derivations D with Di = ∅ implies Di+1 = ∅, we have
Di+1 6= ∅ implies Di 6= ∅. Assume, there does not exists a k ∈ N such that
Dk+1 = ∅. Then Dk+1 6= ∅ for every k and, as d ∈ Dk+1 implies d 6∈
⋃k
i=0 Di at
least for some d, we have |
⋃k
i=0 Di| ≥ k and finally
⋃∞
i=0 Di is infinite, contra-
diction.
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C Properties of Weakest Preconditions
In this section, we give some essential properties of weakest preconditions and
present general facts on implication and equivalence of conditions.
Fact 4 (properties of weakest preconditions).
(1) wlp is universally conjunctive: wlp(P, d ∧ d′) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wlp(P, d′)
(2) wlp is a subcondition of wp: wp(P, d ∧ d′) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧wp(P, d′)
(3) wlp is a subcondition of wtp: wtp(P, d ∧ d′) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wtp(P, d′)
(4) wlp and wtp are subconditions of wp(P, true):
wp(P, d) ≡ ¬wlp(P, false) ∧ wtp(P, d)
(5) wlp is monotonic: d ⇒ d′ implies wlp(P, d)⇒ wlp(P, d′)
Proof. Property (1) “wlp is universally conjunctive”:
G |= wlp(P, d ∧ d′)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= (d ∧ d′)) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ (H |= d ∧H |= d′)) (Def. |=)
⇔ ∀H. ((〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d) ∧ (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d′)) ( (F⇒(G∧H)≡(F⇒G)∧(F⇒H) )
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d) ∧ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d′) ( ∀xF∧G≡∀xF∧∀xG)
⇔ G |= wlp(P, d) ∧G |= wlp(P, d′) (Def. wlp)
⇔ G |= wlp(P, d) ∧ wlp(P, d′). (Def. |=)
Property (2) “wlp is a subcondition of wp”: First, wp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧
wp(P, true) because for every object G ∈ C, G satisfies wp(P, true), if and only
if properties (1)-(3) are satisfied for d (see Definition 5), if and only if properties
(1) is satisfied for d and properties (1)-(3) are satisfied for true, if and only if G
satisfies wlp(P, d) and wp(P, true) (Definition 5). Furthermore:
wp(P, d ∧ d′)
≡ wlp(P, d ∧ d′) ∧ wp(P, true) (wp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wp(P, true))
≡ wlp(P, d) ∧wlp(P, d′) ∧wp(P, true) (Fact 4.(1))
≡ wlp(P, d) ∧wp(P, d′) (wp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wp(P, true))
Property (3) “wlp is a subcondition of wtp”: First, wtp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧
wtp(P, true) because for every object G ∈ C, G satisfies wtp(P, d), if and only if
properties (1) and (3) are satisfied for d (see Definition 5), if and only if property
(1) is satisfied for d and (1) and (3) are satisfied for true, if and only if G satisfies
wlp(P, d) and wtp(P, true) (Definition 5). Furthermore:
wtp(P, d ∧ d′)
≡ wlp(P, d ∧ d′) ∧ wtp(P, true) (wtp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wtp(P, true))
≡ wlp(P, d) ∧wlp(P, d′) ∧wtp(P, true) (Fact 4.(1))
≡ wlp(P, d) ∧wtp(P, d′) (wtp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) ∧ wtp(P, true))
Property (4) “wlp and wtp are subconditions of wp”: For every object G ∈ C,
G satisfies wp(P, d), if and only if properties (1)-(3) are satisfied for d (see
Definition 5), if and only if property (2) is satisfied, and (1), (3) are satisfied for
d, if and only if G satisfies ¬wlp(P, false) and wtp(P, d) (Fact 2 and Definition 5).
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Finally, property (5) “wlp is monotonic”:G |= wlp(P, d) if and only if ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈
JpK ⇒ H |= d), by assumption implies ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JpK ⇒ H |= d′) if and only
if G |= wlp(P, d′).
For the Example 9 in Section 4, we use the following facts on conditions.
Fact 5 (equivalences and implications).
(1) Let I be the M-inital object, i: I → C be the unique M-morphism with
codomain C, and let cx be a condition over C for every index x ∈ X . Then
we have,
∃(i,∨x∈X cx) ≡ ∨x∈X ∃(i, cx)
∀(i,∧x∈X cx) ≡ ∧x∈X ∀(i, cx)
∃(i,∧x∈X cx) implies ∧x∈X ∃(i, cx)
∀(i,∨x∈X cx) if ∨x∈X ∀(i, cx).
(2) For every morphism b ◦ a and condition c over the codomain of b,
∃(a, ∃(b, c)) ≡ ∃(b ◦ a, c)
∀(a, ∀(b, c)) ≡ ∀(b ◦ a, c).
(3) A condition ∃(P →a C) implies ∃(P →a
′
C′) on objects as well as morphisms
with domain P , if there is a M-morphism C′ →c C such that a = c ◦ a′.
(4) A condition ∀(P →a C,
∨
b∈B ∃(C →
b D)) implies ∀(P →a
′
C′,
∨
b′∈B′ ∃(C →
b′
D′)) on objects as well as morphisms with domain P , if there is a M-
morphism C →c C′ such that a′ = c◦a and if for every b ∈ B with s◦c = t◦b
being the associated pushout, and every epimorphism T →e D′ with both
e ◦ s and e ◦ t in M, there is a morphism b′ ∈ B′ with b′ = e ◦ s.
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Proof. (1) and (2) follow directly from the definitions.
(3) For a morphism P →
p
G we observe: p satisfies ∃(P →a C), implies there exist
a M-morphism C →
q
G with p = q ◦ a, implies there exist a M-morphism
C′ →
q′
G with p = q′ ◦ a′ where q′ = q ◦ c (q′ in M as M closed under
composition), implies p satisfies ∃(P →a
′
C′).
(4) For a morphism P →
p
G we observe: p satisfies ∀(P →a C,
∨
b∈B ∃(C →
b D)),
implies for all M-morphisms C →
q
G with p = q ◦ a there exists a M-
morphism D →r G for some b ∈ B with q = r ◦ b. For every M-morphism
C′ →
q′
G with p = q′ ◦ a′, define the M-morphism C →
q
G by q = q′ ◦ c (q in
M asM closed under composition). We observe p = q′ ◦a′ = q′ ◦c◦a = q◦a.
By assumption there exists a M-morphism D →r G with q = r ◦ b for some
b ∈ B. Construct the pushout s ◦ c = t ◦ b. By definition of pushouts,
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there exists a (unique) morphism T →h G with q′ = h ◦ s. Consider the
epi-M-factorization r′ ◦ e = h with epimorphism e and M-morphism r′.
By assumption there is a morphism b′ = e ◦ s in B′. Therefore, p satisfies
∀(P →a C,
∨
b′∈B′ ∃(C →
b′ D)).
For the exemplary proof in Section 4, the following lemma is essential:
Lemma 2 (invariants). For every program p and condition d we have:
If d implies Wlp(P, d) then d implies Wlp(P ∗, d) as well as d implies Wlp(P↓, d).
Proof. By definition Wlp(P ∗, d) =
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d). Using the fact d implies
Wlp(P, d), one can show by induction over i, d implies Wlp(P i, d) for every i ∈ N.
By definition Wlp(P↓, d) = Wlp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false) ⇒ d) and with d implies
(Wlp(P, false)⇒ d) we conclude Wlp(P ∗, d) implies Wlp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false)⇒ d)
(see Fact 4.(5)).
D Proof
In this Section, we present the missing parts of the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorems 5 and 6. We continue to show Wlp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d) and
Wtp(P, d) ≡ wtp(P, d). The proofs are done by induction over the structure
of programs, the basis was given in Section 4. Induction hypothesis: assume the
statements hold for a set of programs S and for programs P, Q. For the induction
step, we have to distinguish the following cases:
For Skip, we have
G |= wlp(Skip, d)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JSkipK ⇒ H |= d) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. (G ∼= H ⇒ H |= d) (Def. JSkipK)
⇔ G |= d. (G ∼= H)
Every application of Skip terminates, hence wtp reduces to wlp. For the nonde-
terministic choice S, we have
G |= wlp(S, d)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JSK ⇒ H |= d) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈
⋃
P∈SJP K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. JSK)
⇔ ∀H. (
∨
P∈S 〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. ∪)
⇔ ∀H.
∧
P∈S (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ H |= d) (
(F∨G)⇒H≡
(F⇒H)∧(G⇒H) )
⇔
∧
P∈S ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ H |= d) (
∀xF∧G≡
∀xF∧∀xG)
⇔
∧
P∈S G |=Wlp(P, d) (Def. wlp, IH. P )
⇔ G |=
∧
P∈S Wlp(P, d). (Def. |=)
G |= wtp(S, true)
⇔ PDer(S) is finite (Def. wtp)
⇔ (
⋃
P∈S PDer(P, G)) is finite (Def. PDer)
⇔
∧
P∈S (PDer(P, G) is finite) (Def. is finite)
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⇔
∧
P∈S G |=Wtp(P, true) (Def.wtp, IH. P )
⇔ G |=
∧
P∈S Wtp(P, true). (Def.|=)
Wtp(S, d) ≡ wtp(S, d), because Wtp(S, d) is defined as
∧
P∈SWtp(P, d), which
is, by induction hypothesis equivalent to
∧
P∈S wtp(P, d), which is, by Fact 4.(3),
equivalent to
∧
P∈S(wlp(P, d) ∧ wtp(P, true)), equivalent to
∧
P∈S wlp(P, d) ∧∧
P∈S wtp(P, true), which is, by induction hypothesis, equivalent to wlp(S, d) ∧
wtp(S, true), which is, by Fact 4.(3), equivalent to wtp(S, d). For the sequential
composition (P ;Q), we have
G |= wlp((P ;Q), d)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ J(P ;Q)K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JQK ◦ JP K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. J(P ;Q)K)
⇔ ∀H. ∀M. ((〈G, M〉 ∈ JP K ∧ 〈M, H〉 ∈ JQK)⇒ H |= d) (Def. ◦)
⇔ ∀M. ∀H. (〈G, M〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ (〈M, H〉 ∈ JQK ⇒ H |= d)) ( (F∧G)⇒H≡(F⇒(G⇒H)) )
⇔ ∀M. (〈G, M〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ ∀H. (〈M, H〉 ∈ JQK ⇒ H |= d)) (x 6∈Free(F ):∀x(F∨G)≡F∨∀xG )
⇔ ∀M. (〈G, M〉 ∈ JP K ⇒ M |=Wlp(Q, d)) (Def. wlp, IH. Q)
⇔ G |= Wlp(P,Wlp(Q, d)). (Def. wlp, IH. P )
G |= wtp((P ;Q), true)
⇔ PDer((P ;Q), G) is finite (Def. wtp)
⇔ PDer(P, G) ∪Der(P, G) · PDer(Q) is finite (Def. PDer)
⇔ PDer(P, G) is finite ∧Der(P, G) · PDer(Q) is finite (Def. is finite)
⇔ PDer(P, G) is finite
∧ ∀H. G⇒∗ H ∈ Der(P, G)⇒ PDer(Q, H) is finite
(Def. Der(P, G))
⇔ G |= Wtp(P, true) ∧G |=Wlp(P,Wtp(Q, true)) (Def.wtp, IH. P, Q,Def. wlp, IH. P )
⇔ G |= Wtp(P, true) ∧Wlp(P,Wtp(Q, true)) (Def.|=)
⇔ G |= Wtp(P,Wtp(Q, true)). (Def.wtp)
We have Wtp((P ;Q), d) ≡ wtp((P ;Q), d), because Wtp((P ;Q), d) is defined as
Wtp(P,Wtp(Q, d)), by induction hypothesis, equivalent to wtp(P,wtp(Q, d)),
which is, by Fact 4.(3), equivalent to wtp(P,wlp(Q, d)∧wtp(Q, true)), which is,
by Fact 4.(3), equivalent to wlp(P,wlp(Q, d)) ∧ wtp(P,wtp(Q, true)), which is,
by induction hypothesis, equivalent to wlp((P ;Q), d) ∧wtp((P ;Q), true), which
is, by Fact 4.(3), equivalent to wtp((P ;Q), d). For the reflexive, transitive closure
of a program P , the weakest liberal precondition wlp(P ∗, d) may be described
as a non finite representation:
G |= wlp(P ∗, d)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP ∗K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ⇒ H |= d) (Def. JP ∗K)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈
⋃∞
i=0JP
iK ⇒ H |= d) (Def. ∗)
⇔ ∀H. (
∨∞
i=0(〈G, H〉 ∈ JP
iK)⇒ H |= d) (Def.
⋃
)
⇔ ∀H. (
∧∞
i=0(〈G, H〉 ∈ JP
iK ⇒ H |= d)) ( ((F∨G)⇒H)(F⇒H)∧(G⇒H) )
⇔
∧∞
i=0 ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP
iK ⇒ H |= d) (∀xF∧∀xG
≡∀xF∧G
)
⇔
∧∞
i=0 G |= Wlp(P
i, d) (Def. wlp, IH. P )
⇔ G |=
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d). (Def. |=)
where for i ≥ 0, P i is inductively defined by Skip for i = 0 and by P i+1 = P i;P .
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G |= wtp(P ∗, true)
⇔ PDer(P ∗, G) is finite (Def. wtp)
⇔ Der(P ∗, G) · PDer(P ) is finite (Def. PDer(P ∗))
⇔ (
⋃∞
i=0 Der(P
i, G)) · PDer(P ) is finite (Def. Der(P ∗), Def. ∗)
⇔ (
⋃∞
i=0 Der(P
i, G) · PDer(P )) is finite (Def. D ·D′)
⇔
∨∞
k=0( (
⋃k
i=0 Der(P
i, G) · PDer(P )) is finite
∧Der(P k+1, G) · PDer(P ) = ∅)
(Lem. 1, Der(P
i,G)·PDer(P )=∅
⇒Der(P i+1,G)·PDer(P )=∅
)
⇔
∨∞
k=0
(∧k
i=0 (Der(P
i, G) · PDer(P ) is finite)
∧Der(P k+1, G) = ∅
)
(Der(P
i,G)·PDer(P )=∅
⇒Der(P i,G)=∅
)
⇔
∨∞
k=0
(∧k
i=0 G |= Wlp(P
i,Wtp(P, true))
∧ G |= Wlp(P k,Wlp(P, false))
)
(Def. wtp, IH. P ,
Def. wlp, IH. P
)
⇔ G |=
∨∞
k=0(
∧k
i=0 Wlp(P
i,Wtp(P, true)) ∧Wlp(P k,Wlp(P, false))) (Def. |=)
⇔ G |=
∨∞
k=0(
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i,Wtp(P, true)) ∧Wlp(P k,Wlp(P, false))) (∗)
⇔ G |=
∨∞
k=0 Wlp(P
k,Wlp(P, false)) ∧
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i,Wtp(P, true)).(i indepen.)
where Lemma 1 is given below and (∗) is:
wlp(P k+1, false) implies
∧∞
i=k+1 wlp(P
i,wtp(P, true)).
This can be seen as follows G |= wlp(P k+1, false) implies Der(P k+1, G) = ∅,
implies Der(P k+1, G) · PDer(P ) = ∅, implies Der(P i, G) · PDer(P ) = ∅ for i ≥
k + 1, implies wlp(P i,wtp(P, true)) for i ≥ k + 1.
Wtp(P ∗, d) ≡ wtp(P ∗, d), as Wtp(P ∗, d) is defined by
∨∞
k=0 Wlp(P
k+1, false) ∧∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d ∧Wtp(P, true)), which is, by induction hypothesis equivalent
to
∨∞
k=0 wlp(P
k+1, false)∧
∧∞
i=0 wlp(P
i, d∧wtp(P, true)), which is, by Fact 4.(3),
equivalent to
∨∞
k=0 wlp(P
k+1, false)∧
∧∞
i=0 wlp(P
i, d)∧
∧∞
i=0 wlp(P
i,wtp(P, true)),
which is, by correctness of Wlp and Wtp(P ∗, true), equivalent to wlp(P ∗, d) ∧
wtp(P ∗, true), which is, by Fact 4.(3), equivalent to wtp(P ∗, d).
The problem to find a weakest precondition for an iteration of P (as long as
possible) may be reduced to the problem for the reflexive, transitive closure P ∗:
G |= wlp(P↓, d)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP↓K ⇒ H |= d) (Def. wlp)
⇔ ∀H. ((〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ∧ ∄M. (〈H, M〉 ∈ JP K))⇒ H |= d) (Def. JP↓K)
⇔ ∀H. ((〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ∧ ∀M. (〈H, M〉 ∈ JP K)⇒ false)⇒ H |= d) ( ¬∃xF≡∀x¬F )
⇔ ∀H. ((〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ∧H |=Wlp(P, false))⇒ H |= d) (Def. wp, IH. P )
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ⇒ (H |=Wlp(P, false)⇒ H |= d)) ( (F∧G)⇒H≡F⇒(G⇒H) )
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP K∗ ⇒ H |= (Wlp(P, false)⇒ d)) (Def. |=)
⇔ ∀H. (〈G, H〉 ∈ JP ∗K ⇒ H |= (Wlp(P, false)⇒ d)) (Def. JP ∗K)
⇔ G |= Wlp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false))⇒ d). (Def. wlp, IH. P ∗)
We have Wtp(P↓, true) ≡ wtp(P↓, true), because Wtp(P↓, true) is defined as
Wtp(P ∗,¬Wlp(P, false) ⇒ true), which is, by induction hypothesis, equivalent
to wtp(P ∗,¬wlp(P, false) ⇒ true), which is equivalent to wtp(P ∗, true), which
is, by Definitions 4 and 7, equivalent to wtp(P↓, true).
Wtp(P↓, d)
≡Wtp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false)⇒ d) (Def. Wtp)
≡ wtp(P ∗,wlp(P, false)⇒ d) (IH. P ∗, P )
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≡ wlp(P ∗,wlp(P, false)⇒ d) ∧ wtp(P ∗, true) (Fact 4.(3))
≡ wlp(P ∗,wlp(P, false)⇒ d) ∧ wtp(P ∗,wlp(P, false)⇒ true) ((F ⇒ true) ≡ true)
≡ wlp(P↓, d) ∧ wtp(P↓, true) (Def. wlp,wtp, IH. P↓)
≡ wtp(P↓, d) (Fact 4.(3))
E Access Control System
In this Section, we continue Example 9. We are investigating, whether or not
secure is invariant. For a proof, we have to show secure implies Wlp(P, secure)
for every program P ∈ Control. So far, we have found proofs for the programs
AddUser and Grant.
We also have secure implies Wlp(Login, secure). The proof is similar to the one
for Grant, as L(Grant, A(Grant, secure)) is similar to L(Login, A(Login, secure)):
L(Login,A(Login, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(Login, secure)
= C(Def(Login)⇒ L(Login,A(Login, secure)))
= C((Appl(Login) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(Login,A(Login, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(Login,A(Login, secure)))
≡ C(L(Login,A(Login, secure)))
= ∀( , L(Login,A(Login, secure)))
≡ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
≡ secure
where we use Fact 5.(1)/(2) and 5.(4) for the last two equivalences, respectively
(see Appendix C). For the program Logout, we have
L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure))
= ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






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L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure))
= ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






Wlp(Logout, secure)
Wlp({Logout1, Logout2}, secure)
= Wlp(Logout1, secure) ∧Wlp(Logout2, secure)
=
C(Def(Logout1)⇒ L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure)))
∧ C(Def(Logout2)⇒ L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure)))
if C(L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure))) ∧C(L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure)))
if
∀( , L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure)))
∧ ∀( , L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C). For
the program ProcessLogin, we show secure implies Wlp(ProcessLogin, secure).
Using Fact 4.(5), we assume here and show later, that for every subpogram P
of ProcessLogin, secure implies Wlp(P, secure).
Wlp(ProcessLogin, secure)
= Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓; ClearLogS↓; DeselectS↓, secure)
= Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓; ClearLogS↓,Wlp(DeselectS↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓; ClearLogS↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓,Wlp(ClearLogS↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓,Wlp(LogS↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectS; AccessS↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectS,Wlp(AccessS↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectS, secure)
if secure
To prove the statement secure implies Wlp(DeselectS↓, secure), we show secure
implies Wlp(DeselectS, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C).
L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
27
Wlp(DeselectS, secure)
= C(Def(DeselectS)⇒ L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure)))
= C((Appl(DeselectS) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure)))
≡ C(L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure)))
= ∀( , L(DeselectS,A(DeselectS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C). To
prove the statement secure implies Wlp(ClearLogS↓, secure), we observe secure
implies Wlp(ClearLogS, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C) even without the
additional application condition:
L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure))
= L(ClearLog,A(ClearLog, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(ClearLogS, secure)
= C(Def(ClearLogS)⇒ L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure)))
= C((Appl(ClearLog) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure)))
≡ C(∃( )⇒ L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure)))
if C(L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure)))
if ∀( , L(ClearLogS,A(ClearLogS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C). For
secure implies Wlp(LogS↓, secure), we show secure implies Wlp(LogS, secure)
(see Lemma 2, Appendix C):
L(LogS,A(LogS, secure))
= ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃






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Wlp(LogS, secure)
= C(Def(LogS)⇒ L(LogS,A(LogS, secure)))
= C((Appl(LogS) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(LogS,A(LogS, secure)))
if C(L(LogS,A(LogS, secure)))
if ∀( , L(LogS,A(LogS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C).
For the program AccessS, secure implies Wlp(AccessS, secure) seems obvious.
However, secure alone is not invariant as the following calculation shows:
L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure))
= ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃



 ∨ ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃



 ∨ ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃



 ∨ ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃



 ∨ ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃



 ∨ ∃






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Wlp(AccessS, secure)
= C(Def(AccessS)⇒ L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure)))
= C((Appl(AccessS) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure)))
≡ C(L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure)))
= ∀( , L(AccessS,A(AccessS, secure)))
if ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ secure
if nosharedsessions ∧ secure
where
nosharedsessions = ¬∃( )
and we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the second last step (see Appendix C).
This is a surprising result, as the condition secure needs to be strenghtened with
the condition nosharedsessions to become invariant. This can be seen as follows:
If a user “shares” a proposed session with another user, then he must also have an
access right to the system. However, unless the access control starts in a state
that already violates nosharedsessions , such a situation cannot occur within
executions of Control as each new session is associated to exactly one user. For
the program SelectS, we observe secure implies Wlp(SelectS, secure):
L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure))
= ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






∧ ∀

 , ∃





 ∧ ∀

 , ∃






Wlp(SelectS, secure)
= C(Def(SelectS)⇒ L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure)))
= C((Appl(SelectS) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure)))
≡ C(L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure)))
= ∀( , L(SelectS,A(SelectS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C).
For the program Revoke, one can show that LogoutUS↓ leaves no sessions for
any selected user and system (see property (4)). As a consequence, RevokeUS
will preserve the satisfaction of secure, as do all other parts of Revoke, hence
secure implies Wlp(Revoke, secure).
(4) After execution of LogoutUS↓, there is no established session left for any
selected user and system: wlp(LogoutUS↓,noestablishedUS ) ≡ true, where
noestablishedUS = ¬∃( )
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(5) C(Appl(Logout1)) ∧ C(Appl(Logout2)) is invariant for all programs P in
Control, and all subprograms and rules of Revoke and DeleteUser.
Property (5) expresses that certain edges adjacent to a session node do not exist,
while others have a multiplicity of at most 1. By using property (5), we can show
Wlp(LogoutUS, false) implies noestablishedUS and thus show property (4):
Wlp(LogoutUS, false)⇒ noestablishedUS
= Wlp({LogoutUS1, LogoutUS2}, false)⇒ noestablishedUS
= (Wlp(LogoutUS1, false) ∧Wlp(LogoutUS2, false))⇒ noestablishedUS
= (C(¬Def(LogoutUS1)) ∧ C(¬Def(LogoutUS2)))⇒ noestablishedUS
≡
(
C(¬(Appl(Logout1) ∧ ∃( )))
∧ C(¬(Appl(Logout2) ∧ ∃( )))
)
⇒ noestablishedUS
≡
(5)
(C(¬∃( )) ∧ C(¬∃( )))⇒ noestablishedUS
≡
(
∀( , ¬∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ¬∃( ))
)
⇒ noestablishedUS
≡ (noestablishedUS ∧ ¬∃( ))⇒ noestablishedUS
≡ true
With the above statement, wlp(LogoutUS↓,noestablishedUS ) ≡ wlp(LogoutUS∗,
Wlp(LogoutUS, false)⇒ noestablishedUS ) ≡ wlp(LogoutUS∗, true) ≡ true.
Proving property (5) for all rules used in Control is tedious, but nonetheless
straightforward, as every subcondition may handled separately. Intuitively only
subprograms and rules have to be considered that contain a session node, and
moreover, that create or delete edges adjacent to session nodes. Back to the
proof secure implies Revoke, using Fact 4.(5), we assume here and show later,
that for every subpogram P of Revoke, secure implies Wlp(P, secure).
Wlp(Revoke, secure)
= Wlp(SelectUS; LogoutUS↓; RevokeUS; DeselectUS, secure)
= Wlp(SelectUS; LogoutUS↓; RevokeUS,Wlp(DeselectUS, secure))
if Wlp(SelectUS; LogoutUS↓; RevokeUS, secure)
if Wlp(SelectUS; LogoutUS↓,Wlp(RevokeUS, secure))
if Wlp(SelectUS; LogoutUS↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectUS,Wlp(LogoutUS↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectUS, secure)
if secure
We prove the statement secure implies Wlp(DeselectUS, secure):
L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
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Wlp(DeselectUS, secure)
= C(Def(DeselectUS)⇒ L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure)))
= C((Appl(DeselectUS) ∧ true)⇒ L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure)))
≡ C(L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure)))
≡ ∀( , L(DeselectUS,A(DeselectUS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C). We
prove the statement secure implies Wlp(RevokeUS, secure):
L(RevokeUS,A(RevokeUS, secure))
= L(Revoke,A(Revoke, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(RevokeUS, secure)
= C(Def(RevokeUS)⇒ L(RevokeUS,A(RevokeUS, secure)))
= C((Appl(RevokeUS) ∧ ∃( ))⇒ L(RevokeUS,A(RevokeUS, secure)))
≡ C(∃( )⇒ L(RevokeUS,A(RevokeUS, secure)))
≡ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
if ∀( , ∃( )) ∧ secure
if noestablishedUS ∧ secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) for the second and 5.(4) for the third last step
(see Appendix C). For secure implies Wlp(LogoutUS↓, secure), we have to show
secure implies Wlp(LogoutUS, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C). The proof is
similar to the one for Logout:
L(LogoutUS1,A(LogoutUS1, secure)) = L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure))
L(LogoutUS2,A(LogoutUS2, secure)) = L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure))
Wlp(LogoutUS, secure)
= Wlp(LogoutUS1, secure) ∧Wlp(LogoutUS2, secure)
= C(Def(LogoutUS1)⇒ L(LogoutUS1,A(LogoutUS1, secure)))
∧ C(Def(LogoutUS2)⇒ L(LogoutUS2,A(LogoutUS2, secure)))
if C(L(LogoutUS1,A(LogoutUS1, secure)))
∧ C(L(LogoutUS2,A(LogoutUS2, secure)))
if secure
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For the SelectUS, we observe secure implies Wlp(SelectUS, secure):
L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ) ∨ ∃( ))
Wlp(SelectUS, secure)
= C(Def(SelectUS)⇒ L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure)))
= C((Appl(SelectUS) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure)))
≡ C(L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure)))
= ∀( , L(SelectUS,A(SelectUS, secure)))
if secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C).
For the program DeleteUser, one can show that LogoutU↓ leaves no sessions
for any selected user (similar to property (4)). As a consequence, RevokeU↓ will
preserve the satisfaction of secure, as do all other parts of DeleteUser, hence
secure implies Wlp(DeleteUser, secure).
We show secure implies Wlp(DeleteUser, secure). Using Fact 4.(5), we assume
here and show later, that for every subpogram P of DeleteUser, secure implies
Wlp(P, secure).
Wlp(DeleteUser, secure)
= Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓; ClearLogU↓; DeleteU, secure)
= Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓; ClearLogU↓,Wlp(DeleteU, secure))
if Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓; ClearLogU↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓,Wlp(ClearLogU↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓,Wlp(RevokeU↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectU; LogoutU↓, secure)
if Wlp(SelectU,Wlp(LogoutU↓, secure))
if Wlp(SelectU, secure)
if secure
We prove the statement secure implies Wlp(DeleteU, secure):
L(DeleteU,A(DeleteU, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(DeleteU, secure)
= C(Def(DeleteU)⇒ L(DeleteU,A(DeleteU, secure)))
= C((Appl(DeleteU) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(DeleteU,A(DeleteU, secure)))
if C(L(DeleteU,A(DeleteU, secure)))
if ∀( , L(DeleteU,A(DeleteU, secure)))
if secure
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where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C).
For secure implies Wlp(ClearLogU↓, secure), we have to show secure implies
Wlp(ClearLogU, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C). The proof is similar to
the one for ClearLogS:
L(ClearLogU,A(ClearLogU, secure)) = L(ClearLog,A(ClearLog, secure))
Wlp(ClearLogU, secure)
= C(Def(ClearLogU)⇒ L(ClearLogU,A(ClearLogU, secure)))
if C(L(ClearLogU,A(ClearLogU, secure)))
if secure
To prove secure implies Wlp(RevokeU↓, secure), we have to show secure implies
Wlp(RevokeU, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C). The proof is similar to the
one for RevokeUS and obmitted. For secure implies Wlp(LogoutU↓, secure), we
have to show secure implies Wlp(LogoutU, secure) (see Lemma 2, Appendix C).
The proof is similar to the one for Logout:
L(LogoutU1,A(LogoutU1, secure)) = L(Logout1,A(Logout1, secure))
L(LogoutU2,A(LogoutU2, secure)) = L(Logout2,A(Logout2, secure))
Wlp(LogoutU, secure)
= Wlp(LogoutU1, secure) ∧Wlp(LogoutU2, secure)
= C(Def(LogoutU1)⇒ L(LogoutU1,A(LogoutU1, secure)))
∧ C(Def(LogoutU2)⇒ L(LogoutU2,A(LogoutU2, secure)))
if C(L(LogoutU1,A(LogoutU1, secure)))
∧ C(L(LogoutU2,A(LogoutU2, secure)))
if secure
For the SelectU, we observe secure implies Wlp(SelectU, secure):
L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(SelectU, secure)
= C(Def(SelectU)⇒ L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure)))
= C((Appl(SelectU) ∧ true ∧ true)⇒ L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure)))
≡ C(true⇒ L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure)))
≡ C(L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure)))
= ∀( , L(SelectU,A(SelectU, secure)))
≡ secure
where we use Fact 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(4) for the last step (see Appendix C).
Figure 5 summarizes the proofs given here, where “. . .” marks the parts that
were not considered further. The conclusion is that most programs and rules
preserve the satisfaction of secure. Noteworthy exceptions are AccessS, where
one additionally has to ensure that there do not exist shared sessions, RevokeUS
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and RevokeU, where the precondition noestablishedUS and noestablishedU are re-
quired, respectively, which can be only shown if Appl(Logout1)∧Appl(Logout2)
is invariant. While tedious, the proof of the missing parts should be straightfor-
ward (only existential quantifications in the statements).
secure implies Wlp(Control, secure)
secure implies Wlp(AddUser, secure)
secure implies Wlp(Grant, secure)
secure implies Wlp(Logout, secure)
secure implies Wlp(ProcessLogin, secure)
secure implies Wlp(DeselectS↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(DeselectS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(ClearLogS↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(ClearLogS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(LogS↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(LogS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(AccessS↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(AccessS, secure)
nosharedsessions implies Wlp(Control, nosharedsessions)
. . .
secure implies Wlp(SelectS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(Revoke, secure)
secure implies Wlp(DeselectUS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(RevokeUS, secure)
true ≡ Wlp(LogoutUS↓,noestablishedUS )
Appl(Logout1) ∧Appl(Logout2) implies
Wlp(Control,Appl(Logout1) ∧Appl(Logout2))
. . .
secure implies Wlp(LogoutUS↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(LogoutUS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(SelectUS, secure)
secure implies Wlp(DeleteUser, secure)
secure implies Wlp(DeleteU, secure)
secure implies Wlp(ClearLogU↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(ClearLogU, secure)
secure implies Wlp(RevokeU↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(RevokeU, secure)
true ≡Wlp(LogoutU↓, noestablishedU )
Appl(Logout1) ∧Appl(Logout2) implies
Wlp(Control,Appl(Logout1) ∧ Appl(Logout2))
. . .
secure implies Wlp(LogoutU↓, secure)
secure implies Wlp(LogoutU, secure)
secure implies Wlp(SelectU, secure)
Figure 5. Structure of the proof
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